Cities and urban centres across the country have become the magnets
that attract a rapidly increasing influx of people. Today, one
of the greatest challenges facing cities is providing suitable
accommodation for ever-increasing populations. And this is what
the DDA sets as an objective with its proposed ‘ultimate
goal’ of ‘Shelter for all’ in its housing policy.
Despite pressing housing problems today with a population of just
over 13.8 million, the DDA envisages ‘a balanced regional
development’ and the ‘comfortable adjustment’
of 23 million by 2021. The aims are admirable but the means end
up as nothing but a pot pourri of ill conceived projections.
To start with, the calculations themselves are wrong. MPD 2021
puts the estimate of ‘urbanisable land’ at 97,790.9
hectares, and separately states that 45 to 55 percent of this
– that is, 53,785 hectares at 55 per cent – is for
residential use. It also seeks a density of 225 persons per hectare
(pph) of housing. Simple multiplication would bring this figure
to just 12.1 million – and not the targeted 22 to 23 million
the Plan envisages. A population of 22 million would take the
density up to 409 pph. Even if 20 per cent of these are located
outside the NCT as MPD 2021 somewhat improbably envisages, the
density would still stand at 327. Indeed, even these figures may
be an underestimate. As Umesh Sehgal, former Secretary of the
National Capital Region (NCR) Planning Board, points out, a more
credible projection is “60 million people in the NCR...”
He adds further, “It is foolish to expect that these will
be evenly spread out. We will have 30 million in Delhi and the
remaining 30 million somehow spread around Delhi.”
There is a revelatory quality about the complete shamelessness
with which the DDA glosses over an even halfway-competent management
of its city. In order to make sense of the vague document that
is the Masterplan 2021 and its obfuscated projections for housing,
it is necessary to look back at DDA’s previous efforts in
this endeavour. In 1961, the DDA was handed over 19,190 hectares
but till date has not been able to build houses on even half of
this land. By 1968 a review of the housing situation revealed
a shortage of 350,000 units, and till that year a total of only
12,000 plots and 1,350 dwelling units had been made available.
Today, official figures place the housing shortage at 450,000
– and those are only official figures.
Instead of being a vigorous, imaginative document that reinvents
itself with a fresh approach towards tackling the pressing problems
of housing, the Master Plan treads the same tired ground, advocating
more of its old, disastrous, failed plans. Thanks to their complete
absence of vision, their inability to reinvent the city, the Delhi
of 2021 will be no more than a city of slums. Indeed, MPD 2021
baldly states that the existing slums will stay and will, in fact,
be ‘regularised’. Currently, 2.9 million persons live
in slums and jhuggi jhompri (JJ) colonies in Delhi. MPD 2021 declares
“the present three-fold strategy of relocation, in-situ
upgradation and environmental upgradation” is good enough
for these and must continue. But can DDA point out a single slum
that looks fit for human habitation as a result of this ‘strategy’,
and that can merge into the overall design of a ‘world class
city’?
The next ‘solution’ proposed by the Master Plan is
“to find ways by which the population growth in Delhi can
be checked.” This is to be achieved by sampling assuming
the 20 per cent of housing needs can “potentially be satisfied
by the development of accommodation in the adjacent NCR cities”.
The careening pace of Delhi’s ‘urbanisation’
sees close to an annual influx of 500,000 migrants a year, and
this is only estimated to increase. A deflection would only occur
if the cities around Delhi magically reinvented themselves and
sucked in the influx. That possibility is remote within the coming
decade, and indeed, Delhi’s population explosion has run
parallel with the dramatic growth of population in all the neighbouring
cities. Where is the planning reflected in a ‘hope’,
a ‘premise’?
Another of the Master Plan’s ‘assessments’
is that 40 per cent of housing needs would “potentially
be satisfied… through redevelopment and upgrading of existing
areas of Delhi. The study on holding capacity also supports that
40 per cent of additional housing needs may be met in the present
urban limits of A to H divisions and in the sub cities of Dwarka
, Rohini and Narela.” MPD 2021 is, however, quite obscure
about the ‘where, when and how’ of this. Areas identified
with ‘surplus holding capacities’ are, in fact, already
overburdened. Rohini, Dwarka and Narela, for instance, have already
been commandeered to a carrying capacity far in excess of original
projections. Nowhere is there a clearly drawn out method of the
means and instrumentalities that will be undertaken to achieve
this well nigh impossible plan.
It is useful to look at the context within which this ‘densification’
of ‘existing areas’ is proposed. MPD 2021 speaks blandly
of 225 pph across Delhi’s ‘urbanisable land’;
no details or projections of their spatial distribution are given.
But the current figures for population densities are startling
to say the least. According to one study in 1991 while the number
of people residing in the NDMC area was 6,882 per sq. km, the
corresponding number for the MCD (urban) area was 16,643. In parts
of South Delhi, the density can be as low as 1,300 per sq. km.,
but moving towards Old Delhi or East Delhi, the average density
was already approximately 80,000 persons per sq. km. in 1981.
Some resettlement colonies have densities of 700,000 a figure
which works out to almost 102 times that of the NDMC area. Yet
the Master Plan appears to suggest that all existing areas are
somehow targeted for ‘densification’.
The plan goes on to declare, “Even if the assumptions regarding
the extent of housing that could be met in the NCR or by redevelopment
of the existing areas, as stated earlier, actually materialize,
there would still be a need for development of housing to the
extent of at least 50,000 DUs (dwelling units) per annum in different
categories.” ‘Actually materialize’! You are
admitting the rather dubious and quite unreliable calculations
of your own Plan?
The complete confusion of thought and the external factors that
govern planning are well demonstrated in the attempt at explaining
the issue of ‘unauthorised colonies’. MPD 2021 notes:
“The issue of existing unauthorised colonies has engaged
attention since the mid–seventies when a policy for regularisation
was formulated. 567 out of 607 listed unauthorised colonies were
regularised till October 1993 but many more unauthorized colonies
have come up since then. 1,071 such colonies were identified in
a survey conducted in 1993, but in the absence of consensus about
how to deal with them and go about the process of regularisation,
their number would have grown further… Based on an aerial
survey carried out in march 2002 guidelines for the regularisation
of unauthorised colonies had been prepared but these have not
yet been finalised for implementation” (emphasis added).
Such indecision, such incompetence and such incoherence. It is
alarming to see so abject an admission of an administration’s
inability to deal with the dynamic of urbanisation. And the future
of our city lies in such hands!
The DDA has been referred to as “the largest real estate
agency in the world, with over 50,000 acres of prime metropolitan
land at its disposal”. Yet despite these phenomenal reserves
of land holdings the city finds itself in the predicament it is
currently in. And it is the skewed policies of the DDA which are
almost single-handedly responsible for this state of affairs.
In a survey conducted by the Hazards Centre, it was found that,
while the planned targets set for the rich were achieved more
than three times over, only 40 percent of the low-end Janata flats
were occupied by the poor, and that 81 percent of low income group
housing was owned by the middle-income and rich groups. Despite
23,000 applicants waiting for housing allotment on November 2002,
some 22,000 of these for Janata and Low Income Group (LIG) flats,
the DDA announced it would take up schemes only for High Income
Group (HIG) flats and that the Janata flats would not be constructed
anymore. The one room Janata flats cost a minimum of Rs. 2 lakhs
, while a two-bedroom flat would cost anywhere between Rs. 9 lakhs
and Rs 16. lakhs . According to the 2001 census there were 33.80
lakh census houses of which 30.02 houses were occupied and 3.78
lakh were vacant. Out of the occupied houses only 23.16 lakh (78.18
per cent) were being used exclusively for residential purposes.
The numbers forcefully demonstrate the rot that the DDA has brought
to pass. Again, according to another report, in the 58 modifications
made to the master plan from 1990-98 pertaining to 5,007 hectares,
land use was modified to ‘manufacturing’ in 4 cases,
totalling 38 hectares, while land re-designated for ‘residential
areas’ was 2,782 hectares, and 200 hectares were changed
to ‘commercial’ use. Yet little of this is translated
into housing for the poor. A study in contrasts reveals that in
1994, there were 4.8 lakh dwelling units in a total area of only
of only of only 9.5 sq. kms – the total area that was occupied
by slums was no more than 1.5 percent of the total urban area
of Delhi. Where did all the re-designated ‘residential’
land go? Evidently to the rich. Former Prime Minister V.P. Singh
had rightly commented that, “The DDA has emerged as the
biggest violator of the master plan”.
And as the DDA fails comprehensively to create the housing and
infrastructure for which it had acquired land from farmers and
private owners, it is left to a desperate populace to scrape together
‘dwelling units’ on vacant lots, forced to breaking
the law and to become squatters by the criminal inefficiency of
the DDA.
It is a fatal flaw that, though it has been given the authority
of a document such as the Master Plan, legal and binding, DDA
has been totally unable to implement its rules and provisions.
When more than half the population of Delhi lives in ‘illegal
makeshift’ and unplanned shelters, which are, by and by,
‘regularised’ you are creating self inflicted chaos.
The notion of planning holds no meaning in such a scenario. Significantly,
by 1994 1,561.66 acres of land belonging to the DDA had been occupied
by 290,678 jhuggies, out of a total of 2,229.72 acres under such
occupation, all on land belonging to other Government agencies.
The flip side involves the DDA watching inert on the sidelines
as slums and JJ clusters grow to assume mammoth proportions, and
then suddenly swooping down and demolishing them, evicting their
residents. If the squatters can be penalised, why not the DDA
for failing to do its job in the first place?
MPD 2021 admits that the failure of the implementation of the
earlier Master Plans has been instrumental in the creation of
unauthorised / regularized colonies, but its solution is an abdication
of responsibility, as it advocates bringing in a ‘greater
element of private sector participation, particularly in the development
of housing’. That the private sector has diligently avoided
all involvement in the low-cost housing sector in the past is
no deterrent to such a proposition, as MPD 2021 adds “incentives
by way of higher FAR, part commercial use of the land an if necessary
and feasible, transfer of Development Rights.” Further incentives
come in the shape of a provision that allows 10 per cent of the
built area in the proposed ghettoes for the poor to be used for
commercial activity, setting up an explosive recipe for free-wheeling
chaos under the Master Plan’s ‘mixed land use’
scheme. Existing units can also be pooled and ‘densified’
with increased FAR and relaxed norms for infrastructure and common
spaces, as the ‘private sector’ is invited to engage
in this process in a ‘cooperative resettlement model’
that would further erode the tenuous ownership rights of the poor.
It does not require extraordinary intellect to figure out the
consequences of these clauses in conjunction, setting up an explosive
recipe for free wheeling chaos.
The retreat of the DDA from housing for the poor and the handing
over of this responsibility to organisations that are not particularly
concerned about the interests of the poor, but rather the exploitation
of land for commercial uses, could prove ruinous for the intended
‘beneficiaries’. MPD 2021 also sees a role for NGOs
in this process, another recipe for disaster if past experience
can be relied on. NGOs are largely funded by international agencies,
and also tend to be fairly clueless about ground realities –
where they are not, in fact, themselves compromised. Given the
situation, the individual poor would be powerless to withstand
forces arrayed more against him than in his favour.
The proposals for creation of new housing for the economically
weaker sections (EWS) start off by invoking that all encompassing
panacea to all of Delhi’s problems – the NCR. Once
again it is imagined that a part of resettlement of squatters
can be accommodated in ‘adjacent NCR areas’. The means
and instrumentalities for making this possible are never spelt
out. New housing within the city is once again farmed out to agencies
as well as private and corporate bodies with the rider that, for
every housing scheme taken by any agency, “10 percent of
the saleable net residential land should be reserved for EWS housing
and pooled on a zonal basis to have its even spread in different
parts of the city and not concentrate in one place.” The
guidelines for this section allow for maximum densification with
a commercial component of up to 10 per cent.
Under ‘new housing areas’ it is stated that 50 to
55 per cent of all new housing would be in the form of one and
two room units with average plinth area of 25 sqm to 40 sqm. MPD
2021 asserts that cost considerations preclude the possibility
of building high for the poor – perhaps the idea of installation
of Lifts for the poor was considered offensive – a curious
conclusion in a situation where the cost of land is perhaps the
most significant element in housing. Since this is assumed to
be the case, however, under the new rules, these units can only
go up to four stories. At one stroke, you have created more than
50 per cent of housing in the city as nothing but one and two
room tenements going up four floors, with plinth areas of 25 to
40 metres! DDA’s warped wisdom is further displayed in its
‘norms for utilities’ for EWS housing: MPD 2021 prescribes
one WC for 10 families and one bath for 20 families – assuming
a modest family size of five persons, this condemns fifty persons
to share a single WC and a hundred to a bath! These bleak, inhuman,
concrete hellholes are the great plan for Delhi in the 21st Century.
And the master ‘eureka moment’ is in the new strategy
for ‘redevelopment’ and ‘upgradation’
of existing areas. Developed DDA colonies, group housing cooperatives
and existing EWS housing can all be ‘densified’ through
‘redevelopment’ by forming cooperative societies or
self-managing communities on the basis of self-financing and through
‘partnerships’ with the private sector. The plan leans
repeatedly on big players, leaving little room for the powerless
individual, and could see builders and developers moving in on
settlements of the poor, easily forcing the unwilling to ‘cooperate’.
The plan goes on to spell out its design for the relocation of
slum clusters. Here again we get an insight into DDA’s vision
and wisdom at work. “In cases of relocation, the sites should
be identified with a view to developing relatively small clusters….
Very large resettlement sites could lead to a phenomenon of planned
slums.” What is planned, evidently, are semi-slums, dismal
huddles of dwellings for second class citizens – the poor,
after all, cannot live in colonies that are well-planned and aesthetically
pleasing. So not too many of the proposed four-storied stacks
of concrete boxes should be built up in one place lest they end
up looking like slum colonies. By keeping their numbers down,
DDA hopes you will not notice them.
Densification and more densification is the only strategy to solve
all housing problems that plague Delhi in every economic segment.
The only time concrete plans are articulated for the development
of housing is when norms for increased FAR, for ‘densification
of existing areas’, are defined. In this city today even
the most well off colonies are feeling the strain of an infrastructure
stretched to its limits, to all appearances, the city can barely
contain its present population. But these same areas have been
earmarked for further ‘densification’? Everywhere,
at every turn, there is an impression that the welfare of the
city is at stake with this ill-conceived plan, as the Master Plan
seeks to build, build and keep building, creating not a ‘world
class city’ but one that is rendered even more chaotic than
it already is. All the stops have been pulled out to make Delhi
as ‘densified’ as possible. How DDA will reconcile
‘densification’ of the magnitude it proposes with
even minimal backup infrastructure is beyond comprehension.
But within all this, behind all the ‘guidelines’
and ‘norms’ what comes through is nothing but a sense
of complete vagueness, with no solid projections and plans. This
is the precise danger of this document. It allows and concentrates
power in the hands of the DDA in such a manner that anything could
be possible, since nothing is clearly stated.
Take the case of the bungalow area. The Master Plan recognises
that the Lutyens’ Bungalow Zone (LBZ) area has a heritage
value which has to be conserved “in the process of redevelopment
of this area”. It goes on to state that “the strategy
for development in this zone will be as per the recommendations
of the committee constituted.” These are plans that should
have been spelt out in MPD 2021, not left to vague strategising
by some committee.
Similar plans are afoot for all Government and cantonment areas.
Large parts of the Cantonment qualify as heritage areas and should
be preserved accordingly. Instead, MPD 2021 earmarks these “prime
lands” for “intensive development” and “a
doubling of housing stock… on a conservative estimate, to
be financed through “cross subsidisation of commercial use”
– mixed land use, again!
If one has to pin point a single reasons why Delhi remains a
city that has a certain charm, a surviving appeal, it is due to
the presence of such areas, the loci of planned low density. Delhi’s
ruination can be traced directly to the pernicious policy of ‘mixed
land use’ imposed on areas planned under exclusive zoning
norms. Tract upon tract of the city has been rendered unliveable
by the random and injudicious application of this policy –
the dying colonies of South Extension, Greater Kailash, Defence
Colony, earlier, the walled city, Karol Bagh – but the DDA
sees none of these ills, none of its inexorable power of destruction,
and seeks to apply the same policy to DDA colonies, heritage,
residential, walled city, urban village and new areas alike. For
them, it is the urban grail; for Delhi, a poisoned chalice.
The writer is a film-maker and Convenor, Urban Futures Initiative
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