So
great is the intellectual bankruptcy of city planners in India today,
they cannot even envision meeting the deficits of our past; to fulfill
the swelling demands of the future appears to lie entirely outside
their sphere of competence. Indeed, some professional city planners
in the country have now started rejecting the very idea of long
term planning, insisting on a process of accretion in which projects
are conceptualized annually - a process that has undermined Masterplans
in the country's metropolii for decades, and already created untold
chaos.
But
as India's population grows, as urbanization expands dramatically,
and as large cities become larger still, only an extraordinary feat
of planning, implementation and management will contain the slide
into chaos, insecurity and probable violence.
Look
at the numbers and what they augur. By year 2021, India's population
is expected to grow to 1.35 billion, against a present population
of about 1.08 billion, bringing it to near parity with China. But
India's total geographical area is one-third China's. Population
pressures are expected to lead to widespread resource scarcities
and increasingly acute - possibly violent - competition between
various groups, which can be exacerbated by political mismanagement
and administrative ineptitude. We are already experiencing tensions
between Indian States and with our proximate neighbours in South
Asia as a result of increasing water scarcities, and these have
the capacity of escalating to what are envisaged as 'water wars'.
The depletion or degradation of a wide range of natural resources;
the progressive diminution of the per capita resource base through
population growth, cropland fragmentation, erosion, deforestation
and desertification; and the augmentation of structural scarcities,
that is, the denial of equal access to particular resources to specific
groups as a result of social and political inequalities, will all
compound an already fragile situation.
As
much as 63 per cent of India's population growth in the first quarter
of the present century is expected to be in its most backward States
- UP, Bihar, MP, Rajasthan, Orissa, Jharkhand, Chhatisgarh and Uttaranchal.
This would take the share of these States in India's population
up from 40 per cent to 50 per cent. These are, moreover, the areas
which have demonstrated some of the most rapid rates of the growth
of disorder and mis-governance in the recent past. Worse, the more
progressive States of South India would have "completed the
demographic transition" by this time with very low growth rates
of population and an increasing age profile. This could provoke
massive migration from the North to these States, and such migrants
would take with them the culture of lawlessness and violence that
afflicts so much of their States of origin.
Patterns
of the urban-rural distribution of populations will also prove crucial
for a variety of reasons. Much has been made of the growth of the
urban population to 40 per cent by 2020, from 27.8 per cent in 2001,
and the pressure this would exert on urban infrastructure, governance
and security. This figure alone does not comprehend the enormity
and complexity of the issues involved. First, the increase of 12.2
per cent actually represents a near doubling of the urban population,
from about 285 million in 2001, to 540 million by 2020. With urban
infrastructure teetering at the very edge of chaos even now, and
with urban governance failing to come to terms with the magnitude
of the present crisis, it is difficult to imagine how the future
can be well ordered.
Crucially,
however, the dramatic growth in the urban population would not provide
any relief to the rural areas. India's rural population in 2020
would stand at 810 million, significantly above the 2001 figure
of 742 million. Despite massive migration to urban areas, consequently,
dependency on the agricultural and rural sector would not decline.
Given the patterns of narrow and focused development in a handful
of priority sectors in the hi-tech arena, rural-urban disparities
can be expected to widen, aggravating social tensions in rural areas,
and pressures of migration on urban areas.
The
pattern of urbanization and development raises other security concerns.
A bulk of the projected development will occur along a handful of
"corridors of growth", which would make these particularly
vulnerable to subversion and disruptive activities. Further, much
of the urban growth would result from the densification of a relatively
small number of expanding metropolii and megapolii, which would
be subjected to a number of negative processes, including intensive
'ghettoisation'. This is the potential consequence of the fact that,
in many cases, rural migrants bring their 'culture' of caste and
exclusion with them, even as there is increasing evidence of 'ghettoisation'
between rich and poor in India's cities. In addition, at least some
of these megapolii may be created across State boundaries (as is
already the case with the National Capital Region), with consequent
problems of coordinated management of issues of security and governance.
These various factors will exacerbate tensions. With increasing
densification, the progressive pressure on, and occasional collapse
of, the urban infrastructure and services, and poor governance,
the scope for criminal and violent political mobilisation would
be extraordinary, creating enormous challenges of policing and security.
India
has, of course, put great faith in economic liberalization and globalization
- and these processes have, over the past decade and a half, resulted
in dramatic improvements in certain sectors of the economy. But
this progress has a narrow base, and has gone side by side with
the marginalization of large sections of the population, widening
areas of poor governance, and escalating security challenges. It
is crucial to understand, within this context, that scarcities and
consequent social tensions can and do coexist with rapid rates of
growth and with declines in the national poverty ratio. The late
1990s and early 2000s have witnessed the most dramatic declines
in India's poverty ratio, but also some of the most unsettling signs
of rural distress (malnutrition, starvation deaths and the spreading
incidence of 'farmer suicides' in some of the most unexpected locations),
demonstrating the fact that "scarcity and abundance may very
well coexist". This period has also witnessed the most dramatic
extension of the regions of disorder and violence, with insurgent
and terrorist movements of various ideological persuasion variously
affecting as many as 220 of the countries 602 districts.
Many,
however, celebrate the growth of population, speaking of the 'youth
bulge' that will help the Indian economy boom - and eventually equal
and overtake China. Regrettably, however, the 'youth bulge' also
has a downside, and has historically been associated with instability
and internal conflict in many theatres in the world. The people
of a nation are, no doubt, its greatest assets; but the failure
to effectively and efficiently harness this great national resource
can transform them into a liability and a source of instability,
violence and security risk. India's internal difficulties will,
moreover, continue to the exploited by traditionally hostile neighbours,
whose own internal problems can only be expected to grow, given
present demographic trends.
There
is an astonishing feat of planning required if we are to cope with
these mounting challenges. There are technical and technological
solutions available to deal with many of the crises that the city
is subject to, but these have to be systematically factored into
the enterprise of urban management and governance if they are to
succeed. Unfortunately, our capacities to imagine the future and
to impose some order on it appear to be frighteningly limited; and
unless we can overcome this intellectual deficit, the future can
only promise greater disorders.
Ajai
Sahni
Associate
Director, Urban Futures Initiative; Executive Director, Institute
for Conflict Management
Published in The Pioneer, August 11, 2005
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